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Abstract
Guilt aversion induces experience of a utility loss in people if they believe they have dis-
appointed others, and this promotes cooperative behaviour in human. In psychological
game theory, guilt aversion necessitates modelling of agents that have theory about what
other agents think, also known as Theory of Mind (ToM). We aim to build a new kind of
affective reinforcement learning agents, called Theory of Mind Agents with Guilt Aversion
(ToMAGA), which are equipped with an ability to think about the wellbeing of others
instead of just self-interest. To validate the agent design, we use a general-sum game
known as Stag Hunt as a test bed. As standard reinforcement learning agents could learn
suboptimal policies in social dilemmas like Stag Hunt, we propose to use belief-based guilt
aversion as a reward shaping mechanism. We show that our belief-based guilt averse agents
can efficiently learn cooperative behaviours in Stag Hunt Games.
1. Introduction
People in a group may be willing to give more and take less. This may appear irrational
from the individual perspective, but such behaviour often enables the group to achieve
higher returns than acting selfishly. Therefore, in building artificial multi-agent systems, it
is important to construct social inductive biases about the reasoning of other agents - also
known as the Theory of Mind (ToM) (Rabinowitz et al., 2018; Shum et al., 2019). Theory
of mind enables individuals to cooperate and this often results in optimal group rewards
(Shum et al., 2019; Takagishi et al., 2010).
A mechanism to encourage social cooperation is maintaining fair outcomes for members
of the group, and agents who do so are termed ‘inequity averse’ (Hughes et al., 2018). Other
mechanisms stem from guilt (Haidt, 2012), requiring one to put themselves in the others’
shoes (Chang et al., 2011; Morey et al., 2012). To be guilt averse, the agent needs higher-
order ToM - i.e. be able to estimate what others will do (0-order ToM), and what others
believe the agent itself will do (1-order ToM) (Albrecht and Stone, 2018). Inequity aversion,
on the other hand, is conceptually different from guilt aversion (Nihonsugi et al., 2015) and
does not require theory of mind. We focus on the computational mechanisms to control the
interplay between the greedy tendencies of an individual and the inferred needs of others
in a reinforcement learning (RL) setting. In (Moniz Pereira et al., 2017; Rosenstock and
O’Connor, 2018), authors analysed the evolutionary dynamics of agents with guilt, but did
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ToMAGA
not include theory of mind. There has been early work to integrate theory of mind and
guilt aversion in a psychological game setting (Battigalli and Dufwenberg, 2007). The first
work to examine social dilemmas in a deep reinforcement learning setting is (Hughes et al.,
2018; Peysakhovich and Lerer, 2018a) in which the authors incorporate knowledge from
behavioural game theory when training the agents. However, guilt aversion, which plays a
central role in moral decisions (Haidt, 2012) has not been considered.
Our paper addresses the open challenges of integrating theory of mind and guilt aversion
into Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL) (Littman, 1994) and studies the evolu-
tion of cooperation in such agents in self-play settings. We name the agent ToMAGA, which
stands for Theory of Mind Agent with Guilt Aversion. In our agents, learning is driven by
not only material rewards but also psychological loss due to the feeling of guilt if an agent
believes that it has harmed others. Our computational model of theory of mind extends the
work of (De Weerd et al., 2013) to build agents with beliefs about cooperative behaviours
rather than just primitive actions. Our reinforcement learning agent uses a value function
to make sequential decisions. At each learning step, after observing the other agents’ ac-
tions, the agent updates its beliefs about the other agents, including what they might think
about it. Then it computes psychological rewards using a guilt averse model, followed by
an update of the value function. In other words, this implements a reward shaping strategy,
where the additional reward is from the intrinsic social motivation of being fair to others.
In reinforcement learning, reward shaping helps to guide the exploration and increase the
convergence speed of the algorithm. Different from (Devlin and Kudenko, 2011) in which
the reward shaping function was defined over the state space, our reward shaping func-
tion, on the other hand, is defined over actions space. To help understand how this reward
shaping is effective in social dilemmas, we construct a theoretical argument to show that
guilt aversion implemented as reward shaping can change the Stag Hunt game from having
two pure Nash equilibria into having one pure Nash equilibrium that is Pareto efficient. In
addition, our agents are able to cooperate in the grid-world Stag Hunt Games, in which
the rewards given to each agent depend on the sequence of actions (at the policy level),
not just on one action like in matrix-form games. We build several environments, both in a
one-step decision game and in a multi-step grid-world. Our extensive suite of experiments
demonstrates that modelling guilt with explicit theory of mind helps reinforcement learning
agents to cooperate better than those without theory of mind, encouraging faster learning
towards cooperative behaviours. At last, we demonstrate the efficiency of our reward shap-
ing mechanism on more complex rewards structure and action space environments. We also
demonstrate that the mechanism can handle the case in which there are more than two
agents.
Our contribution is to design and test a framework that brings the psychological con-
cept of guilt aversion into multi-agent reinforcement learning, and in effect it connects social
psychology, psychological game theory (Geanakoplos et al., 1989), multi-agent systems and
reinforcement learning. For the first time, we explore and establish a computational model
for embedding guilt aversion coupled with theory of mind on reinforcement learning frame-
work and study it in the extended Markov Games.
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C U
C h, h g, c
U c, g m,m
Table 1: The structure of Stag Hunt (h > c > m > g).
2. Preliminaries
2.1. Two-player Markov Games
A two-player fully observable Markov Game is a tuple 〈N ,S,A,R,P〉, where N = {1, 2}
denotes the set of two players, S is the state space, A =A1 ×A2 is the joint action space,
R =R1 × R2 is the reward space with R1,R2 : S × A 7→ R, P is the transition function
P : S × A 7→ ∆(S), where ∆(S) denotes the probability distribution over S. Each agent i
takes an action ai ∈ Ai based on its policy pii : S 7→ Ai. Denote by Πi the set of all policies
available to the player i. The set of joint policies is Π = Π1 ×Π2.
Definition 1. A joint policy pi = (pi1, pi2) ∈ Π, denoted as piC = (piC1 , piC2 ), is a cooperative
joint policy iff
pi = argmaxpi1∈Π1,pi2∈Π2Ea1∼pi1,a2∼pi2,st+1∼P [R] , for
R =
∞∑
t=0
γt [r1(a1, a2, st) + r2(a1, a2, st)]
If two agents follow a cooperative joint policy piC , we say that two agents have cooperative
behaviours. We denote ΠC as a set of cooperative joint policies.
Definition 2. A policy pii is a cooperative policy iff
∃j ∈ N\i, pij ∈ Πj : (pi1, pi2) ∈ ΠC .
We denote ΠCi as a set of cooperative policies. A policy pii ∈ Πi\ΠCi of agent i is called an
uncooperative policy. We denote ΠUi = Πi\ΠCi as a set of uncooperative policies.
The definition says that if the agent i follows policy pii and there exists at least one policy
pij of agent j that their joint policy pi = (pi1, pi2) is a cooperative joint policy, then the policy
pii a cooperative policy.
2.2. The Stag Hunt Game
Stag Hunt is a coordination game of two persons hunting together (Macy and Flache, 2002).
If they hunt stag together, they can both obtain a large reward h. However, one can choose
to trap hare gaining a reward, sacrificing the other’s benefit. The reward matrix is shown
in Table 1. The game has two pure Nash equilibria: (1) both hunting stag, which is Pareto
optimal; (2) or both hunting hare. If one player thinks the other will choose to hunt hare,
her best response will be hunting hare. This is because in the worst case, if hunting hare, the
player will receive a reward m. This amount is larger than g which is the worst case if she
3
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Figure 1: The learning process in Theory of Mind Agents with Guilt Aversion (ToMAGAs).
hunts stag. Therefore, both hunting hare is the risk-dominant equilibrium (Harsanyi et al.,
1988). Here, the dilemma is that the risk-dominant Nash equilibrium is not the Pareto
optimal. There is one mixed Nash equilibrium but its common outcome is not Pareto
optimal. Because both will receive the highest collective rewards when jointly hunting stag,
both hunting stag is a joint cooperative policy. Therefore, hunting stag is a cooperative
policy that is also Pareto efficient.
3. Theory of Mind Agents with Guilt Aversion
We present our agent model named Theory of Mind Agent with Guilt Aversion (ToMAGA).
The internal working process of the agent is illustrated in Fig. 1. It has a ToM module that
is augmented with a guilt aversion (GA) component. We detail these parts as follows.
3.1. Settings
In our setting, an agent learns: (1) to predict whether the other agent follows a cooperative
policy or an uncooperative policy; and (2) a cooperative policy. These objectives are also
a part of things to learn in a fully observable games in the area of Multi-agent Learning
(MAL) (Shoham et al., 2007). During the kth iteration, agent i follows its policy pi
(k)
i .
For readability, we omit the superscript (k). At each time step t of an iteration in the
game, two agents simultaneously take actions, hence, generating a trajectory of experiences
τ =
(
s(t), a
(t)
1, a
(t)
2 , r
(t+1)
1 , r
(t+1)
2 , s
(t+1)
)T−1
t=0
. We make the following assumptions about the
observations of agents and the reward structure of the training environment
Assumption. (about the observations) In any iteration k, a policy pii for i ∈ N belongs
to the set of joint cooperative policy ΠCi or the set of uncooperative policies Π
U
i . Both agents
can observe this information.
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We denote by li = C the event that at iteration k the policy of agent i is a cooperative
policy pii ∈ ΠCi and by li = U the event that the policy of agent i is an uncooperative policy
pii ∈ ΠUi .
Assumption. (about the reward structure) After reaching the termination state of the
game, the agents receive material rewards r
(T )
1 (li, lj) and r
(T )
2 (li, lj). The rewards follow
the structure of the Stag Hunt Game described in Table 1.
3.2. First-order Theory of Mind (ToM1) Agent
We construct ToM1 agents as in (De Weerd et al., 2013). Agent i maintains two beliefs:
(1) zero-order belief b
(0)
i (lj) for lj ∈ {C,U} which is a probability distribution over events
that agent j 6= i follows a cooperative or an uncooperative policy; and (2) first-order belief
b
(1)
i (li) for li ∈ {C,U}, which is a recursive belief, representing what agent i thinks about
the belief of agent j’s belief (the probability distribution over events that agent i follows a
cooperative or an uncooperative policy). At the end of each iteration, agent i observes a
trajectory τ and the information about whether the executed policies were cooperative or
uncooperative, i.e.
{
l˜i, l˜j
}
. Agent i first predicts whether agent j uses a cooperative or
an uncooperative policy. The prediction is based on the current first-order belief b
(1)
i (li) as
follows
lˆj = argmaxlj∈{C,U}Φij(lj) where
Φij(lj) =
∑
li∈{C,U}
b
(1)
i (li)× r(T )j (li, lj),
where Φij(lj) is the value function agent i thinks agent j will have if agent j greedily
maximises its material reward. Now, agent i has two guesses about the agent j: the zero-
order belief b
(0)
i (lj) and policy type lˆj . To combine these two pieces of information into the
belief about the action of agent j, called a belief integration function BI(lj). To do this,
agent i maintains and updates a confidence cij ∈ [0, 1] about its ToM1 as follows:
cij ← (1− λ)cij + λδ
[
lj = lˆj
]
for learning rate λ ∈ [0, 1] and identity function δ [·]. After updating the confidence, agent
i then computes its belief integration function
BI(lj)← (1− cij) b(0)i (lj) + cijδ
[
lj = lˆj
]
for all lj ∈ {C,U}. Now the agent i can update its zero-order belief as
b
(0)
i (lj)← BI(lj),
for all lj ∈ {C,U} and first-order belief as
b
(1)
i (li)← (1− cij) b(1)i (li) + cij × δ
[
li = l˜i
]
,
for all li ∈ {C,U}.
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3.3. Guilt Aversion (GA)
The guilt averse agent i will experience a utility loss if it thinks it lets the other agent
down. The utility loss is realised through reward shaping. More concretely, once beliefs are
updated, the agent i first computes an expected material value experienced by the agent j:
φj =
∑
li,lj∈{C,U}
b
(0)
i (lj)× b(1)i (li)× r(T )j (li, lj) (1)
where r
(T )
j (li, lj) is the material reward received after the last time step T . In addition, the
agent experiences a psychological reward of “feeling guilty”, caring about how much it lets
the other down, as (Battigalli and Dufwenberg, 2007):
r
(psy)
i (l˜i, l˜j) = −θij max
(
0, φj − r(T )j (l˜i, l˜j)
)
(2)
where guilt sensitivity θij > 0. The reward is then shaped as:
r∗i = r
(T )
i (l˜i, l˜j) + r
(psy)
i (l˜i, l˜j). (3)
This computation is based on an assumption that a guilt averse agent does not know
whether the other is guilt averse.
3.4. Update the Value Function
Algorithm 1: ToMAGA i
Input : K is the number of iterations
Tmax is the maximum timesteps per iteration
Output: The policy pii
1 for k ← 0 to K − 1 do
2 Reset τ (k);
3 for t← 0 to Tmax do
4 Takes action a˜
(t)
i based on the value function;
5 Add the new experience to τ ;
6 if st is the termination state then
7 break;
8 end
9 end
10 Get information about policies
{
l˜i, l˜j
}
;
11 Update beliefs b
(0)
i (lj) and b
(1)
i (li) ;
12 Compute psychological reward r
(psy)
i (l˜i, l˜j);
13 forall experiences in τ do
14 Update the value function by using r∗i in Eq. 3;
15 end
16 end
6
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C U
C h+ r(psy), h+ r(psy) g + r(psy), c+ r(psy)
U c+ r(psy), g + r(psy) m+ r(psy),m+ r(psy)
Table 2: The reward structure of Stag Hunt games after having psychological reward factor
defined in Eq. 2.
Given the shaped reward in Eq. (3), the reinforcement learning agent learns by updating
the value function as follows.
Matrix-form Stag Hunt Because the size of the state space |S| = 1, the strategy of
agent i reduces to select action ai, and agent i updates its value function based on temporal
difference algorithm TD(1):
Vi(a˜i)← Vi(a˜i) + α∆i, where
∆i = r
∗
i + γmaxai
∑
aj
b
(0)
i (ai)ri(ai, aj)− Vi(a˜i)
General Stag Hunt with Deep Reinforcement Learning In the general Stag Hunt
games, we parameterise the value function and policy by deep neural networks trained by
the Proximal Policy Optimization (PPO) (Schulman et al., 2017). The training algorithm
is shown in Algorithm 1.
3.5. Theoretical Analysis
We now show that guilt aversion implemented as reward shaping can change the Stag Hunt
game from having two pure Nash equilibria into having one pure Nash equilibrium that
is Pareto efficient. We recall that ToMAGAs play the game with a new pay-off matrix as
shown in Table 2. We then establish the following observations.
Observations: (1) If there exists a sequence of trajectories leading to φj > m and θij >
m−g
min(φj ,c)−m with i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j, this game will have only one pure Nash equilibrium, in
which both players choose to cooperate (C,C); and (2) ToMAGA with higher guilt sensitivity
θij will have a higher chance of converging to this pure Nash equilibrium in self-play setting.
Proof. This game will have only one pure Nash equilibrium (NE), in which both players
choose to cooperate (C,C), when two conditions hold:
(C1) h− θijmax(0, φj − h) > c− θijmax(0, φj − g)
(C2) g − θijmax(0, φj − c) > m− θijmax(0, φj −m)
for h > c > m > g, the sensitivity θij > 0, and the expected material value experienced by
other agent φj ∈ [g, h] described in Eq. 1. (C1) holds within the structure of the Stag Hunt
game. When φj ∈ (c, h], (C2) is satisfied iff θij > m−gc−m . When φj ∈ (m, c], (C2) is satisfied iff
θij >
m−g
φj−m . Therefore, the first observation is proved. To prove the second observation, we
7
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Figure 2: Initial probability of the second player following cooperative strategy (y-axis) vs
Initial probability of the first player following cooperative strategy (x-axis). The
colour shows the probability (lighter values indicate higher probability) of the
first player following cooperative strategy after 500 timesteps of (A) Guilt averse
agents without theory of mind and (B) ToMAGAs.
consider the case when φj ∈ (m, c], the condition θij > m−gφj−m ⇔ φj >
(
m+ m−gθij
)
, f(θij)
implies φj ∈ (f(θij), c]. Because f(θij) is a decreasing function, the chance of φj belongs to
(f(θij), c] is increasing when θij is increasing, i.e. the second observation is proved.
By introducing the psychological rewards, we increase the probability of changing the
game from two Nash equilibria to one Nash equilibrium, which intuitively helps the rein-
forcement learning algorithm converge to Pareto efficient Nash equilibrium. In other words,
the higher guilt sensitivity the agents have, the more chance that they will converge to the
cooperative behaviour. During the exploration, both agents need to obtain higher beliefs
about the event that other will choose a cooperative policy. If both agents believe that the
expectation of other are higher than the outcome that players received when they are at
risk-dominant Nash equilibrium, i.e. φj > m, then higher θij will lead to higher chance to
converge to NEs. However, initially, if both agents believe that the expectation of other are
equal or lower than the inefficient outcome, i.e. φj ≤ m, the agents need to increase this
expectation during the training process.
4. Experiments
We test our ToMAGAs in three environments: (1) Matrix-form Stag Hunt Games; (2) Grid-
world Stag Hunt Games; and (2) The modified version of Stag Hunt Games called Island
with the more complex reward structure and action space.
4.1. Matrix-Form Stag Hunt Games
In this experiment, we aim to answer two questions:
8
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Q1: How does ToM model affect cooperative behaviour in the self-play setting? We
compare the behaviour of ToMAGAs and GA agents without ToM that do not update first
order beliefs. All agents have the guilt sensitivity θij = 200. The initial probabilities of each
agents to follow a cooperative strategy constitute the grid index in Figure 2). We measure
the probability of the agents following cooperative policy after 500 timesteps of playing the
matrix-form games with h = 40, c = 30,m = 20, g = 0. Figure 2 shows that ToMAGAs
promote cooperation better than the guilt averse agents without theory of mind. This is
more pronounced in settings where agents are initialised with a low probability of following
cooperative strategy (to the left bottom corner of Figure 2-A and 2-B).
Q2: How does ToMAGA promote cooperative behaviour in a group of agents? The
experiments are designed similarly to the tournament commonly used in studies of how co-
operation could evolve (Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981). In each round, agents are randomly
matched and each pair plays the matrix-form of Stag Hunt game with h = 5, c = 4,m =
2, g = 1. We report the average common reward of the last 100 rounds after 5000 rounds of
interaction.
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Size of the Group
8.8
9.0
9.2
9.4
9.6
9.8
10.0
Common Rewards
Pavlov
ToM (without GA)
ToMAGA
Pavlov & ToMAGA
Figure 3: Common Reward (y-axis) vs Size of
Group (x-axis). ToMAGAs encour-
age the cooperation in both homo-
geneous and heterogeneous groups.
Common reward is higher when a
group contains ToMAGAs.
There are two types of groups: homo-
geneous group and heterogeneous group;
and two types of agents: ToMAGA and
Pavlov agent. We compare behaviours of
ToMAGAs in groups with a general ver-
sion of Win-Stay-Lose-Shift (WSLS) strat-
egy, called Pavlov agent, which is a popular
strategy for solving Stag Hunt. A Pavlov
agent (Kraines and Kraines, 1996) chooses
to hunt stag with probability pn =
i
n with
0 ≤ i ≤ n and updates the strategy based
on the outcome it received and actions that
both took in the last interaction. The prob-
ability cooperatively hunt stag pn is in-
creased when two players matched their be-
haviours, and pn is decreased otherwise. In
the heterogeneous group of N agents, there
are (N − 1) Pavlov agents and a ToMAGA.
From the structure of Stag Hunt games, if
one group has more agents with cooperative
behaviours, they will obtain higher average
common rewards. Fig. 3 shows that the ho-
mogeneous group of ToMAGAs cooperate better than the homogeneous group of Pavlov
agents. As the size of heterogeneous groups is small, having one ToMAGA will enhance the
cooperation and help to obtain higher common rewards. When the size of the group in-
creases, the homogeneous group of ToM agents without guilt aversion converge much slower
than the group of ToMAGA. This leads to the homogeneous group of ToM agents without
guilt aversion has lower common rewards than the homogeneous group of ToM agents after
5000 rounds of interaction.
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Iterations
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Individual Learners
0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000
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ToMAGA
Cooperative Policy Uncooperative Policy Unknown behaviour
Figure 5: Policies of individual learners (column A), agents with inequity aversion (column
B), GA agents without ToM (column C), and ToMAGAs (column D) when they
start nearby the stag (the first row) and nearby hares (the second row). Pro-
portion of following cooperative (blue), uncooperative (orange), unknown (green)
behaviours (y-axis) vs Iterations (x-axis).
4.2. Grid-World Stag Hunt Games
In the grid-world Stag Hunt games, two players simultaneously move in a fully observable
4 × 4 grid-world, and try to catch stag or hare by moving into their squares (see Fig. 4).
A B
Figure 4: The grid-world version of Stag Hunt
Games. Two agents (blue dia-
monds) learn to hunt the moving
stag (brown circle) or the static
hares (green cell) while avoiding the
obstacles (in gray). Agents start
(A) start nearby the stag, and (B)
nearby the hares.
Every timestep, each player can choose
among 5 actions {left, up, down, right,
stay}. While the players need to cooperate
to catch the stag, i.e. both move to the
position of the stag at the same time, each
player can decide to catch the hare alone.
The rewards given to agents follow the re-
ward structure of the Stag Hunt games. In
detail, if two players catch the stag together,
the reward given to each player is 4.0. If two
players catch the hares at the same time,
the reward given to each player is 2.0. Oth-
erwise, the player catching the hare alone
will receive a reward of 3.0, and the other
will receive 0.0. The game is terminated
when at least one player reaches the hare,
two players catch the stag, or the time Tmax
runs out.
Recall in the section 2.2 that both players cooperatively catching the stag result in
policies that are Pareto efficient. We are interested in two situations: At the beginning of
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the training process, agents are put (A) nearby the stag and far from the hares, and (B)
put nearby the hares and far from the stag. We hypothesise that it is easier for agents
to learn to cooperatively catch the stag if they are put nearby the stag at the beginning.
After each iteration, each policy will be labelled as follows: (1) when both hunt the stag,
labels are (l˜i = C, l˜j = C); (2) when one hunts hare and other hunts stag, labels are U and
C, respectively; (3) when both hunt hare, labels are U ; and (4) if the game is terminated,
the policies of the agent who does not hunt hare or stag will be considered as unknown
behaviours.
We construct deep reinforcement learning agents having both value network and policy
network trained by PPO (Schulman et al., 2017). We compare the behaviours of four types
of agents: (1) the individual learners; (2) the agents with inequity aversion (IA) (Hughes
et al., 2018); (3) the GA agents without ToM; and (4) the ToMAGAs. Individual learners
are agents that behave self-interest and only optimise their rewards. Inequity averse agents
are agents that have a shaping reward r
(psy)
i = − θadN−1 ×
∑
j 6=i
max(ri − rj , 0) − θdis adN−1 ×∑
j 6=i
max(rj − ri, 0), where N is the number of agents, θad and θdis ad are advantageous and
disadvantageous sensitivity, respectively (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999).
Fig. 5 shows the policies of deep reinforcement learning agents over the training process
when they start nearby the stag (the first row of Fig. 5) and nearby the hares (the second
row of Fig. 5). In both cases, the individual learners i.e. deep reinforcement learning
agents without social preferences cannot learn to cooperate and even learn the uncooperative
behaviours (to individually catch hares) since the very early stage of training process if
they start nearby hares. In contrast, the deep reinforcement learning agents with social
preferences can learn to cooperate in both cases. When the agents are put nearby stag at
the beginning, the performance of inequity averse agents is comparable to GA agents without
ToM and the ToMAGA (the first row of columns B, C, and D of Fig. 5). However, when
initialised nearby hares, GA agents without ToM and ToMAGA learn to cooperate faster
than the inequity averse agents (the second row of columns B, C, and D of Fig. 5). Also, in
this case, our ToMAGAs can learn to cooperate faster than the GA without ToM because
the GA without ToM does not update its first-order belief, leading to wrong predictions
about the expectation of others.
4.3. The Island: ToMAGA in a Complex Environment
This suite of experiments aims to demonstrate the performance of our reward shaping
mechanism on more complex environments, we consider the behaviours of ToMAGA on the
Island and its extended version with more agents (Large-Island) (Wang et al., 2020). These
environments are modified versions of the Stag Hunt game with more complex rewards
structure and action space. In Island game, there are two agents and a beast in a 10× 10
environment. Instead of only moving around by choosing left, up, down, right, stay
as in the grid-world Stag Hunt games, the agent must get close and choose attack to kill
the beast. Similarly, the beast also can move and attack the agents which are in its attack
range. The beast and agents will have its own energy which will be reduced if they are
attacked, and one will be killed if their energy is equal 0. The agents will receive a reward
11
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Trajectory
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Figure 6: The behaviours of the EDTI agents and EDTI agents augmented with theory of
mind and guilt aversion in the 10× 10 Island environment with static beast. The
upper part is Team Performance (y-axis) vs Number of Updates (x-axis). The
lower part is the visitation count of the agents overtime. A cell with lighter colour
means that it is visited more frequently by the agents. EDTI agents augmented
with theory of mind and guilt aversion learns to cooperative attack the beast
faster and tend to maintain equity in the team.
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Figure 7: Team Performance (y-axis) vs Number of Updates (x-axis). The performance of
EDTI agents and EDTI agents augmented with theory of mind and guilt aversion
on complex environments, which are: (A) Island and (B) Large-Island.
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300 if they kill the beast. In this island, there are treasures, which an agent only individually
receives a reward of 10 if they collect. If the agents jointly attack the beast, they will kill
the beast faster and reduce the chance of being killed. In the Large-Island, we aim to test
our reward shaping mechanism with more than two agents. In this environment, the team
with four agents will explore the 4× 4 island.
We build our rewards shaping mechanism to the agent Exploration via Decision-Theoretic
Influence with intrinsic rewards (EDTI) (Wang et al., 2020). In both environments, the la-
bels of agents’ policies will be given to agents at the end of each episode. An agent will be
considered as following cooperative behaviour if this agent attacks the beast at least once
during the episode. In the Large-Island, to handle the interaction of more than two agents,
an agent i will have the first-order belief not only about what other believes about itself,
but about what other believes about others. Therefore, the first-order beliefs of agents are
implemented as described in (von der Osten et al., 2017). For example, the first-order belief
of agent i is b
(1)
i =
{
b
(1)
j,k |j ∈ N \ {i}, k ∈ N
}
, which is what agent i believes about agent j
believes about agent k for all j ∈ N \ {i}, k ∈ N .
To illustrate the behaviours of the EDTI agent and EDTI agent augmented with theory
of mind and guilt aversion, we fix the beast on the Island at the cell (9th, 9th) (on the right
bottom corner of the environment) and the treasures at cells (1th, 1th) and (2th, 1th) (on the
left top corner of the island). Figure 6 shown the team performance which is the average of
team rewards and the visitation of agents (cells that have ligher colour are cells that visited
more frequently by agents). In the earlier phase, both type of agents tend to visit the top
left of the environment and collect the treasures. Over time, the agents start to discover the
position of the beast and learn how to attack the beast. The EDTI agents augmented with
theory of mind discovered the strategy of together attacking the beast and focus on visiting
cells nearby the beast faster than the EDTI agents. It worth noting that the EDTI agent
1 finds the beast and attacks the beast before the EDTI agent 2, .i.e. the right bottom
corner of the visitation map of the agent 1 is lighter than the visitation map of the agent 2,
which shows the phenomena of inequity between two EDTI agents in this particular setting.
In contrast, because the EDTI agents augmented with theory of mind and guilt aversion
try to match the expectation of each other, they tend to preserve the equity. The team
performance in the Island with moving beast is shown in Figure 7-A. Figure 7-B shown the
efficient of augmenting EDTI with theory of mind and guilt aversion in the Large-Island.
This demonstrates that our rewards shaping mechanism can be extended to the setting with
more than two agents.
5. Related Works
Theory of Mind (Gopnik and Wellman, 1992; Premack and Woodruff, 1978; Gordon, 1986),
or the ability of understanding that other having mental states, is crucial ability for an
agent which involves in social interactions. In economics, it is studied as forecasting the
forecast of other (Townsend, 1983). In multi-agent system, it is known as modelling others
(Albrecht and Stone, 2018) to reduce the non-stationary problem while learning agents
are updating their models simultaneously. Recent works in cognitive science and artificial
intelligence have proposed several computational model of Theory of Mind such as the
Bayesian Theory of Mind (Baker et al., 2011, 2017; Yoshida et al., 2008) and Machine Theory
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of Mind (Rabinowitz et al., 2018). In (De Weerd et al., 2013), authors used ARIMA(0,1,1)
to model theory of mind as the recursive reasoning about other. The agent with Theory
of Mind level-1 will hold a belief about what other agents think about its action. (von der
Osten et al., 2017) extended this model to the settings in which there are more than two
agents, which requires each agent holds belief about the believe of other not only about
itself but also about others, i.e. thinking about other thinking about other. We used the
Theory of Mind level-1 models described in (De Weerd et al., 2013; von der Osten et al.,
2017) for belief about the higher level of actions to construct the belief based guilt aversion
agent.
Solving social dilemma still is a challenge for reinforcement learning agents (Peysakhovich
and Lerer, 2018b). Using behavioural game theory as prior knowledge, recent works demon-
strated that inequity averse agents (Hughes et al., 2018) and prosocial agents (Peysakhovich
and Lerer, 2018a) can promote cooperation in social dilemma. However, belief based guilt
aversion (Battigalli and Dufwenberg, 2007), which is a well known mechanism in psycholog-
ical game theory to promote cooperation, has not been studied in multi-agent reinforcement
learning. (Moniz Pereira et al., 2017; Rosenstock and O’Connor, 2018) only considered the
guilt without theory of mind model agents on evolutionary dynamics. We instead use the
guilt aversion with theory of mind model to shape the reward of reinforcement learning
agents.
6. Conclusion
We present a new emotion-driven multi-agent reinforcement learning framework in which
reinforcement learning agents are equipped with theory of mind and guilt aversion - the
emotion faculty that induces a utility loss in an agent if it believes that its action has
caused harm in others. We studied the agent behaviours in Stag Hunt games, which simulate
social dilemmas, whose Pareto optimal equilibrium demands cooperation between agents
making it hard for pure reinforcement learning agents. We validated the framework in three
environments for Stag Hunt games. Our results demonstrate the effectiveness of belief-based
guilt aversion over other methods.
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